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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION,
Petitioner-Defendant,
Case No. 890189-CA

vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and
ALLEN G. WHITE,

(Case Priority No. 6)

Respondent-Applicant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPLICANT ALLEN G. WHITE

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §351-86 (Supp. 1988).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Was

the

capricious

Industrial

Commission's

decision

that Alan White was an employee

arbitrary

and

of Jess Aylett

Construction?
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Benefits were awarded to Allen G. White by the Industrial
Commission of Utah.

Petitioner Jess Aylett Construction filed a

Petition for Writ of Review to this Court on or about March 30,
1989.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Procedurally,

the

case

is

controlled

by

Utah

Code

Annotated, §35-1-84 (Addendum 1) and §35-1-85 (Addendum 2) as
they existed as of the filing of the case (December 2, 1986).
Substantively, the case is governed by Utah Code Annotated §351-42(2) (as it read in March, 1986) (See attached Addendum 3)
and

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

case,

Bennett

v.

Industrial

Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986) (See Addendum 4 ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case;
Allen

G.

White

(Allen

White)

claimed

that

employee of Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall

he

was

an

(Aylett) for

purposes of receiving an award of workers compensation benefits.
Benefits

were

awarded

by

the Administrative

Law Judge

and

affirmed by the Industrial Commission.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below:
1.

Allen White was injured on March 17, 1986.

(R. 2)

2.

On December 23, 1986, Allen White filed an Application

for Hearing because Defendants had denied responsibility for
medical

treatment,

payment

of

temporary

total

disability

compensation and permanent partial disability compensation.

(R.

4)
3.

Aylett responded to the Application for Hearing denying

2

that he was responsible for the injuries sustained by Allen
White.

(R. 3-6)

4.

A hearing was held on April 9, 1987, before Richard G.

Sumsion, the Administrative Law Judge.

Evidence was presented

by Allen White, Steve White and Aylett.

(R. 34-175)

5.

Following

the

hearing

Defendant

Aylett

was

given

through April 15 to arrange an independent medical examination
with another doctor.
6.

(R. 205)

The parties were also allowed to provide additional

documentary evidence to the Judge.
under advisement.
7.
prepared

The matter was then taken

(R. 206)

On September 9, 1987, the Administrative Law Judge
Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Order

determining that Allen White was an employee of Jess Aylett dba
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall at the time of his injury.
(R. 285-292) (Addendum 5)
8.

On September

15, 1987, a copy of the

independent

medical examination performed at the request of Defendant Aylett
was submitted to the Administrative Law Judge.
9.

Jess Aylett, individually, pro

Review on September 24, 1987.
filed

a

Motion

for

Review

se, filed a Motion for

(R. 299-300)

concerning

(R. 293-298)

both

Aylett's counsel
the

appropriate

impairment rating and the employment relationship between the
parties on October 8, 1987.

(R. 304-329)
3

10.

The

Administrative

Law

Judge

then

entered

"Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order"
modifying the portions of his original Order dealing with the
impairment rating and the appropriate amount of compensation to
be paid.

No modifications were made concernincj the original

Findings of Fact that Aylett was the employer of Allen White for
workers compensation purposes and as such was responsible for
payment of benefits to White..
11.

Another

Motion

(R. 330-334) .

for Review was

counsel which concerned only the impairment rating.
was

then

referred

by

the

Administrative

independent medical examiner.

Aylett7s

filed by

Law

(R. 340-341).

The matter

Judge

to

an

The examiner's

report was furnished to the parties (R. 342-345).
12.

The Administrative Law Judge then issued an Amended

Supplemental Order which made no changes from his prior Order.
(R. 348-350).
13.

A Motion for Review of that Order was filed by Jess

Aylett, pro se.
14.
adopted

(R. 351).

The Industrial Commission considered the case and
the

Administrative

Law

Judge's

Findings

of

Fact

concerning the employment relationship between Allen White and
Aylett.

The Commission found Aylett liable for White's workers

compensation benefits.

(R. 355-357). (Addendum 6)

4

15.

Aylett filed the pending Petition for Writ of Review

from the Commission's Order.

(R. 359)

C. Statement of Facts;
1.

Jess Aylett, doing business as Jess Aylett Construction

and Drywall began working as a drywall contractor in 1985 (R. at
165) .
2.

In late January, 1986, Allen White and his brother

Steve White began working for Aylett.

(R.49)

While working for

Aylett, Allen and Steve White worked as a team and split their
wages 50/50.
3.

(R. 49)

Aylett did not have any discussion with either Allen or

Steve White regarding workers compensation or other insurance,
nor did Aylett tell them he would not assume responsibility for
any accident.

Aylett probably stated he would not withhold

taxes (R. 167).
4.

In

testimony

at

the

Industrial

Commission,

Aylett

claimed to have no "employees" but from January to March of 1986
had at least four people doing hanging, taping and finishing for
him as "subcontractors."
5.

(R. 165).

Aylett told Allen and Steve White where to work, (R.

52,64,75,132,193)

gave them a completion date and

furnished

tape, mud, corner bead, nails and scaffolding when they needed
it. (R. 60,87,132).

Allen and Steve White furnished their own

hand tools and some taping equipment.
5

(R. 60,132)

6.
day.

Aylett was at the job site every day or every other

He checked on their performance and completion and told

them where to go when that house was done.
7.

(R. 75,132)

Allen and Steve were paid on a "per foot" rate.

calculated

the

accordingly.

number

(R. 70)

of

feet

completed

and

Aylett

paid

them

They worked approximately eight hours per

day and often Saturday and Sunday for Aylett (R. 148)
8.

The first four checks were made out to Allen White

individually.

The next check was made out to Steve White.

(R.

181-184).
9.

On March

17, 1986,

(the day of the injury) Aylett

called Allen White at home at approximately 6:00 a.m. and wanted
them to tape a garage for another "taper" who did not show up.
Aylett wanted them to be at work at 8:00 a.m.
10.

(R. 53)

Allen White was injured when the stilts on which he

was standing to tape the 10 foot garage ceiling collapsed.
(R. 54 ) .
11.

He sustained a severe fracture with dislocation at his

left elbow.

The injury required surgery.

fourteen and half weeks of work.
sustained

a permanent

impairment

extremity. (R. 330-335) (Addendum 5)

6

Allen White missed

(R. 54, 285-292)
of

31% of the

He also

left upper

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The findings of the Industrial Commission are supported by
substantial evidence.

Jess Aylett dba Jess Aylett Construction

and Drywall had the right to control Allen White7s work and
exercised that right.

He told White when to work, gave him a

time table for completion of the work, furnished materials and
some equipment, inspected the job site and calculated the amount
he was to be paid based on the amount completed on a weekly
basis.
The Administrative Law Judge, heard evidence presented by
the injured worker, Allen White, his brother, Steve White, a coworker and Aylett. The Judge concluded that because the work
done by White was "part or process" of the business of Aylett,
and involved the same trade or business of Aylett Construction
and Drywall (emphasis added), White was an employee within the
meaning of §35-1-42(2) Utah Code Ann. and when injured was
entitled to workers compensation benefits.
Appellant attempts, in his brief, to shift responsibility
for benefits owed to White to the alleged general contractor on
the job, George Hobbs Construction.

Hobbs was not a party to

the preceding below and it is improper to attempt to adjudicate
his rights herein.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS FINDINGS MUST BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The Application for Hearing in the matter was filed on
September 24, 1986.

As this was prior to the effective date of

the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (See section 63-46b-22(2)
(1989) the matter is controlled by the law in effect at the time
of the filing.

Section 35-1-84 (1974) (repealed 1987, repeal

effective January 1, 1988) provides, in part:
"Upon such review the Court may affirm or
set aside such awards, but only upon the
following grounds: (1) that the commission
acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) that the Findings of Fact do not support
the award."
Section 35-1-84 should be read together with §35-1-85

(1974)

(repealed 1987, effective January 1, 1988) which states:
"The Findings and Conclusions of the
Commission on questions of fact shall be
conclusive and final and shall not be
subject to review; such questions of fact
shall include ultimate facts and the
Findings
and
Conclusions
of
the
Commission...."
The

Commission's

Findings

of

Fact

are

awarded

great

deference and the Findings are not to be disturbed unless they
are

"arbitrary

and

capricious."

Utah

Department

of

Administrative Servs. vs. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d
8

601 (Utah 1983).

"The Commission's Findings of Fact should be

sustained if there is evidence of any substance whatsoever which
can

reasonably

made."

be

regarded

Kennecott

as

Corporation

supporting
Employees

the
vs.

determination
Department

of

Employment Security. 13 Ut. 2d 362, 372 P.2d 987, 989 (1962).
The

Administrative

Law

Judge

and

Industrial

Commissions

decision that Allen White was an employee of Aylett should be
affirmed.
Further support

for the decision

is the long

standing

principal that the Workers Compensation Act is to be liberally
construed and doubts as to compensation should be resolved in
favor of the Applicant.
P.2d 153

McPhie vs. Industrial Commission, 567

(Utah 1977) and State Tax Commission vs. Industrial

Commission. 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984).
Applying

these

standards,

since

there

is

substantial

evidence in the record that Aylett exercised control over the
work of Allen Whitef and they were involved in the same trade or
business, the benefits awarded to White should be affirmed.
POINT II
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION AND DRYWALL WAS AN
EMPLOYER OF ALLEN G. WHITE FOR WORKERS
COMPENSATION PURPOSES •
Jess

Aylett

dba

Jess

Aylett

Construction

and

Drywall

contracted with various parties to install and finish drywall on
projects.

From January to the time Allen White was injured
9

Aylett

had

no

less

than

four

different

persons

performing

drywall installation and finishing at his request and on these
projects,

(R. 165)

subcontractors.
business.

Aylett considered these drywall installers

However, they were "part or process" of his

Section 35-1-42(2) provides:
"...where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and such work is a
part or process in the trade or business of
the employer, such contractor...shall be
deemed, within the meaning of this section,
employees of such original employer." (1985)
(Addendum 1)

That section has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to
hold that work is "part or process in the trade or business of
the employer" if it relates to the successful performance of the
enterprise of the employer.

Bennett v. Industrial Commission of

Utah, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).

Aylett Construction and Drywall

(emphasis added) was in the business of installing and finishing
drywall.

That was the integral part of Aylett's business and

without employees such as Allen White, the business would not
have continued.
Bennett.

supra,

extensively

quoted

by

Aylett,

essentially two different employment relationships.
is the relationship between Bennett
Johnson

Brothers

(a

concerns
The first

(the injured worker) and

subcontractor) .

The

s€»cond

is

the

relationship between Bennett and C. L. Mathews Construction (the
10

general contractor).

In deciding that Bennett was an employee

of Johnson Brothers, the Court held that if an "employer" has
the right to control the work of the injured worker, the worker
is an employee for workers compensation purposes."
supra

Bennett,

at 429-430.
Numerous examples of the control exercised by Aylett are

contained in the record:

he told White where to work each day;

gave him completion date or time for each home; and furnished
such equipment as tape, mud, bead and scaffolding.

Aylett also

calculated the amount of work which had been completed each week
and White was paid based on Aylett's calculations.

On the day

of the accident, White was even asked to be at work at a certain
time.

(R. 53)

Such control is sufficient to evidence the

employment relationship.
POINT III
THE ATTEMPT TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY TO HOBBS IS IMPROPER.
Aylett's
responsible.

brief

does

not

argue

that

not

Hobbs Construction was

never made a party to these proceedings.
in

is

The principle focus is that Hobbs Construction

should be required to provide benefits.

hearing

Aylett

this

case,

Aylett

testified

At the time of the
that

the

general

contractor on the job was George Hobbs or George Hobbs Homes.

11

(R. 197)

Hobbs was not joined by Defendant.

Applicant also did

not seek to have Hobbs made a party as he was also uninsured.1
Aylett

cannot

responsibility

escape

liability

to George Hobbs

determined in Bennett, supra,

by

attempting

Construction.

to

shift

As the

Court

responsibility of the employer,

such as Aylett, and the statutory employer, such as Hobbs, are
concurrent.

A finding that George Hobbs or another entity was

the general contractor in this particular job would not relieve
Aylett of liability.
Aylett's attempt to pass responsibility on to George Hobbs
Construction is inappropriate.

That is especially the case when

Hobbs is also uninsured.
CONCLUSION
The Administrative

Law Judge

and

Industrial

Commission

correctly concluded that Allen White was an employee of Jess
Aylett

Construction

purposes.

and

Drywall

for

workers

compensation

At the time of White's injury, he was performing work

for and at the request of Aylett.

Aylett had the right to and

was exercising control over the work and the work was a "part or
process" of the business of Aylett.
The decision awarding benefits is supported by the evidence

1

At the time of the hearing, White's attorney checked
with the policy department of the Industrial Commission.
No
policy was in effect for George Hobbs or George Hobbs Homes.
12

in the case and

is not arbitrary

and capricious,

For the

foregoing reasons, it should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

H
^

day of October, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

Brief

of Respondent/Applicant

Allen G. White,

postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Jess K. Aylett
11613 South High Mt. Drive
Sandy, UT 84092
Industrial Commission of Utah
150 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0250
DATED AND SIGNED this

day of October, 1989.
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ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-84 (1985)

1

Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-85 (1965)

2

Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-42(2) (1985)

3

Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 4
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order

5

Order Denying Motion for Review

6

ADDENDUM 1

ADDENDUM 1
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-84 (1985) (repealed effective January
1, 1988)
FURNISHINGS AND CERTIFYING PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSCRIPT
TO SUPREME COURT - POWER OF COURT TO AFFIRM OR
SET ASIDE AWARD - GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE.
Upon the filing of the action for review the court shall
direct the

commission

to

furnish

and

certify to the

Supreme

Court, within twenty days, all proceedings and the transcript of
evidence taken in the case, and the matter shall be determined
upon the record of the commission as certified by it.

Upon such

review the court may affirm or set aside such award, but only
upon the following grounds:
(1)

That the commission acted without or in excess of its

powers;
(2)

That the findings of fact do not support the award.

ADDENDUM 1-1

ADDENDUM 2

ADDENDUM 2
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-85 (1965) (repealed effective January
1, 1988)
DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - FILING - CONCLUSIVENESS
ON QUESTIONS OF FACT - REVIEW - COURT JUDGMENT
After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the
commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
writing and file the same with its secretary.

The findings and

conclusion of the commission on questions of fact shall be
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review; such
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings
and conclusion of the commission.

The commission and every

party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall
have the right to appear in the review proceedings.
hearing

the court shall

enter judgment

setting aside the award.

ADDENDUM 2-1

Upon the

either affirming

or

ADDENDUM 3

ADDENDUM 3
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42(2) (1985)
EMPLOYERS ENUMERATED AND DEFINED - REGULARLY
EMPLOYED - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Every person, firm and private corporationf including every
public

utility,

having

in

service

on

or

more

workmen

or

operatives regularly employed in the same business, or in or
about

the

express

same

or

establishment,

implied,

oral

or

under

any

written,

contract
except

of hire,

agricultural

employers who meet any one of the following conditions:

(a)

whose employees are all members of the immediate family of the
employer, which employer has a proprietary interest in the farm;
provided that the inclusion of any immediate family member under
the provisions of this title is at the option of the employer or
(b) who employ five or fewer persons other than immediate family
members for 40 hours or more per week per each employee for 13
consecutive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months;
and except domestic employers who do not employ one employee or
more than one employee at least 40 hours per week; provided,
that employers of agriculture laborers and domestic servants,
shall have the right to come under the terms of this title by
complying

with

the

provisions

thereof

and

the

rules

and

regulations of the commission.
The term
employments

in

"regularly" as herein used
the

usual

course

of

the

shall

include all

trade,

business,

profession or occupation of the employer, whether continuous
throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains
supervision or control, and such work is a part or process in
the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and
all

persons

employed

by

any

such

subcontractors,

shall

be

deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of such
original employer.

Any person, firm or corporation engaged in

the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be
deemed an employer within the meaning of this section.

The term

"independent contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any
person, association or corporation engaged in the performance of
any work for another, who while so engaged, is independent of
the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work,
is not subject to the rule of control of the employer, is
engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of
work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a
result in accordance with the employer's design.

ADDENDUM 3-2

ADDENDUM 4

BENNETT v. INDUST AL COM^ OF UTAH
Cite as 726 P^4

dissenting); see also Moody v. Moody, 715
P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in result) (very high standard
for reopening custodial orders); Hirsch v.
Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1986)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring separately)
(custody changes governed by strict standards, different from those applicable to
initial custody awards). To state the applicable standard carelessly is to invite confusion in an area in which courts have exceptional powers over the lives of children of
divorced parents, an area where the eradication of such confusion should be an important goal. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d
at 1322 (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately).
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

Robert N. BENNETT, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Johnson Brothers Construction and
C.L. Matthews Construction, Defendants.
No. 20705.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 30, 1986.
Injured worker sought reversal of Industrial Commission order which denied
him worker's compensation benefits. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that (1)
Commission erred, as matter of law, in
holding that injured worker was not employee of construction contractors, and (2)
subcontractor's employee is deemed employee of general contractor if general contractor retains some supervision or control
over subcontractor's work and work done

Utah

427

n (Utah 1986)

by subcontractor is "part of process in
trade or business of the employer."
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, J., concurred in result
1. Workers' Compensation <3»1935
In reviewing Industrial Commission orders, Supreme Court defers to Commission's findings of fact unless it makes findings not supported by substantial evidence;
Court does not defer to Commission when
construing statutory terms or when applying statutory terms to facts unless construction of statutory language or application of law to facts should be subject to
Commission's expertise gleaned from its
accumulated practical, firsthand experience
with subject matter.
2. Workers' Compensation <3»1935
Whether worker is employee within
meaning of workmen's compensation law
requires application of statutory standard
to facts, and resolution of issues which are
not benefited by Commission's expertise or
experience; thus, court does not defer to
Commission's ruling in such instances.
3. Workers' Compensation <3=>1939.11(3)
Since evidence in workmen's compensation case was essentially uncontradicted,
court needed only to determine whether, as
matter of law, Industrial Commission erred
in ruling that injured worker was not an
employee of contractor.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>235
If evidence shows that "employer" retains right to control work of claimant,
claimant is usually considered an "employee" for workmen's compensation purposes.
5. Workers' Compensation <s=>235
Concept of right to control in workmen's compensation cases should not be
rigidly and narrowly defined; rather, it is
proper to resolve doubt as to whether
worker was employee in favor of employee.
6. Workers' Compensation <s=>235
Factors included in determining whether employer has right to control employee's
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work includes actual supervision of worker,
extent of supervision, method of payment,
furnishing of equipment for worker, and
right to terminate worker's employment.

STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Robert N. Bennett seeks reversal of an Industrial Commission order

which denied him workers' compensation
benefits. At issue is whether Bennett was
an employee of Johnson Brothers Construction and a "statutory employee" of C.L.
Matthews Construction Co. We reverse
the Commission's order.
The facts are as follows: Bennett, a
trained cement finisher, was regularly employed by Johnson Brothers Construction
from May, 1983, until November, 1983,
when he was terminated due to a reduction
in work force. After termination, Bennett
collected unemployment benefits. During
his unemployment, he established a checking account in the name of Bob Bennett
Construction and informed Johnson Brothers that he intended to obtain a contractor's license, although he never did. During December, 1983, Bennett performed
several small jobs for Johnson Brothers.
On each job, he was paid cash in a lump
sum without any deductions from the payments.
In February, 1984, C.L. Matthews Construction contracted to do remodeling
work, including replacing the concrete
driveway, at the Kimball Condominium in
Salt Lake City. Matthews let a subcontract to Johnson Brothers to remove and
replace the driveway. Johnson Brothers
and Matthews agreed that payment for the
job would be approximately $400 and that
Matthews would furnish the concrete and
rental equipment, including a jackhammer
and a compressor, for the project. Matthews testified that he "went through all
the details with Chris [Johnson], and then
left the job for him to complete." Johnson
Brothers then contacted Bennett and another former employee, Don Russell,1 and,
as the Commission stated, "asked them if
they would like to do the job for a set
sum." The job would take about two days.
Bennett and Russell agreed.
On the first day,, they removed all the
concrete and completed the subgrading.
On the second day, according to the Commission, "Johnson Brothers appeared at the
site twice to see how the work was coming

1. The former employee is referred to in the
transcript as "Don CrummiL" His affidavit,

however, is signed "Don Russell." We refer to
him as Don Russell.

7. Workers' Compensation <3»235
Industrial Commission erred, as matter
of law, in holding that injured worker was
not employee of construction contractor
where contractor retained and exercised
right to control worker's job conduct, contractor hired coemployees, and worker performed same job as he had previously performed during prior employment with contractor.
8. Workers' Compensation <s=>351
Under statute, subcontractor's employee is deemed employee of general contractor if general contractor retains some supervision or control over subcontractor's
work and work done by subcontractor is
part or process in trade or business of
employer. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-42(2).
9. Workers' Compensation <&»351
Term "supervision or control" in workmen's compensation statute requires only
that general contractor retain ultimate control over project in order to retain "supervision or control" so as to make general
contractor a "statutory employer." U.C.A.
1953, 3&-l-42(2).
10. Workers' Compensation <3»355
As long as subcontractor's work is
part or process of general contractor's
business, an inference arises that general
contractor has retained supervision or control over subcontractor sufficient to meet
requirement of worker's compensation statute. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-42(2).
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for plaintiff.
Carvel R. Shaffer, Bountiful, Erik M.
Ward, Ogden, for defendants.
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along and to check the specifications."
During that day, Russell struck a nail
which flipped into Bennett's eye. The injury resulted in surgery and the possibility
that Bennett may need a lens transplant to
fully regain his vision.
After Bennett was injured, one of the
Johnsons stepped in to help Russell complete the job. Johnson Brothers tendered
Bennett a check for $150 made payable to
"Bob Bennett Construction" for his work
on the job. Bennett refused to cash the
check and returned it to Johnson Brothers
with a note stating that he did not have a
contractor's license. He requested that
Johnson Brothers reissue the check payable to him personally.
The Commission held that Bennett was
not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because he was an independent contractor. Its ruling was based on the findings that Bennett had intended to become
an independent contractor, had established
a bank account for a contracting business,
and had been paid in a lump sum with no
deductions. The Commission also found
that Johnson Brothers "did not exercise a
demonstrable amount of control over the
work project. They only made two inspection visits to the site to determine if the
specifications were being met." Because
the Commission ruled that Bennett was not
an employee of Johnson Brothers, it did not
address the nature of the legal relationship
between Matthews and Johnson Brothers.
I.
[1] In reviewing Industrial Commission
orders, we defer to the Commission's findings of fact unless it makes findings not
supported by substantial evidence. Pinter
Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305,
307 (Utah 1984). We do not defer to the
Commission when construing statutory
terms or when applying statutory terms to
the facts unless the construction of the
statutory language or the application of the
law to the facts should be subject to the
Commission's expertise gleaned from its
accumulated practical, first-hand experience with the subject matter. See general-

ly, Utah Department of Administrative
Services v. Public Service Commission,
658 P.2d 601, 611 (Utah 1983).
[2,3] Whether a worker is an employee
within the meaning of the workmen's compensation laws requires the application of a
statutory standard to the facts. Since resolution of the issue is not benefitted by
Commission expertise or experience, we do
not defer to the Commission's ruling.
Board of Education v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49,
51 (Utah 1984). See also Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 455,
196 P.2d 502, 504 (1948); Stover Bedding
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah
423, 424-25, 107 P.2d 1027, 1027 (1940).
Since the evidence is essentially uncontradicted, we need to determine only whether,
as a matter of law, the Commission erred
in ruling that Bennett was not an employee. See Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977);
Sommerville v. Industrial Commission,
113 Utah 504, 506, 196 P.2d 718, 719 (1948);
Intermountain Speedways, Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah 573, 577-78,
126 P.2d 22, 24 (1942); Stover Bedding Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah at 425,
107 P.2d at 1028; Strieker v. Industrial
Commission, 55 Utah 603, 607-08, 188 P.
849, 851 (1920).
II.
[4,5] On the merits, we first address
the issue of whether the Commission erred
in ruling that Bennett was not an employee
of Johnson Brothers. Section 35-l-43(l)(b)
defines "employee" as every person "in the
service o f an employer as defined in
§ 35-1-42(2). What constitutes being "in
the service o f has often been determined
by reference to common law master-servant principles, although in Rustler Lodge,
we indicated a broadening of the term pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 220. Rustler Lodge, 562 P.2d at 228.
However, it will almost always follow that
if the evidence shows that an "employer"
retains the right to control the work of the
claimant, the claimant is the employer's
employee for workmen's compensation pur-
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poses. E.g., Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286,1291 (Utah 1976); Auerbach Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347,
195 P.2d 245 (1948). Certainly, the concept
of right to control is not to be rigidly and
narrowly defined.2 Rather, it should be
defined to give full effect to the remedial
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. See Hinds Co. v. Industrial Commission, 20 Utah 2d 322, 437 P.2d 451
(1968), which held that it was. proper to
resolve doubt as to whether a worker was an
employee in favor of the employee.
[6] Many factors have been applied in
determining the right to control. Among
those factors are actual supervision of the
worker, the extent of the supervision, the
method of payment, the furnishing of
equipment for the worker, and the right to
terminate the worker. Harry L. Young &
Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318
(Utah 1975). Although these factors are
not inclusive, they are relevant in many
cases, including this case.
[7] The uncontested evidence indicates
that Johnson Brothers retained and exercised the right to control Bennett's job conduct. Johnson Brothers dealt with Bennett
as an employee. Bennett was simply told
how much he would be paid. During the two
days Bennett was on the job, someone from
Johnson Brothers appeared twice to oversee Bennett's performance. When Ben-

nett was injured, Johnson Brothers provided
the labor to fill in for Bennett. They hired
both Bennett and Don Russell to do the job. It
was not Bennett who hired Russell, as
would have been the case if Bennett were
an independent contractor. Bennett was
hired to do a short, one-time project Thus,
although Bennett wais paid in a lump sum,
rather than by the hour, the pay tendered
was reduced, apparently because of his
time off the job due to the accident Even
though he had no deductions withheld from
his pay, that is of no significance since the
amount paid was so small and the job of
such short duration.
Although Bennett had been an employee
of Johnson Brothers and although he had
been terminated because of a reduction in
work force, his recall for a short time was
consistent with the manner in which he had
performed during his previous tenure with
Johnson Brothers. He performed exactly
the same type of work he had performed
while officially on Johnson Brothers' payroll. Finally, it was Matthews who furnished both the concrete and the heavy
equipment that Bennett and Russell used
on the job.3 Nothing in Bennett's relationship to Johnson changed, except for Johnson Brothers' not withholding payroll deductions from the amounts paid Bennett
On somewhat similar facts, a claimant in
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d
1020 (1961), was held to be an employee.

2. Professor Larson strongly suggests that right
§ 43.50. If a worker is integrally or continuof control is an inappropriate test for determinously involved in an employer's business, and
ing employee status for workers' compensation
the worker's own operations are not such that
purposes. 1C A Larson, Workmen's Compensathey could readily channel the costs of an industion Law, § 43.42 (1986). The control test was
trial accident to the general population, the
borrowed from agency law. The purpose of
worker should be considered an employee for
agency law, to define the limits of a master's
workmen's compensation purposes. Id.
vicarious liability for a servant's misdeeds, is
entirely different from the remedial purpose of
3. Professor Larson states that the furnishing of
the workmen's compensation acts, which is to
valuable equipment to a worker indicates an
spread the burden of industrial accidents
employer-employee relationship. The furnishacross the population. Id; see Pinter Construcing-of-valuable-equipment rule should only aption Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah 1985);
ply
to valuable equipment. An employer would
Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99
have a much greater interest in controlling the
Utah 423, 429-31, 107 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (1940)
actions of a worker using the employer's $10,(Wolfe, J., dissenting). Therefore, Larson sug000 truck than in controlling a worker using the
gests, more emphasis should be placed on the
employer's $5 hammer. Larson, supra, § 44.34.
nature of the work performed. Larson, supra,
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There, the worker was hired to furnish and
operate a drilling rig for one specific drilling project. He was not listed as an employee on the employer's books, nor were
deductions withheld from his pay. However, he was paid by the shift and a supervisor was present most of the time he
worked.
Bennett's intention to become an independent contractor at some indefinite time
in the future was irrelevant Although he
had opened a bank account in the name of
"Bob Bennett Construction," and had apparently obtained the papers to apply for a
contractor's license, he never actually filed
them. What Bennett might have intended
to do later was not indicative of his status
at the time of the accident.
In sum, we hold that the Commission
erred, as a matter of law, in holding that
Bennett was not an employee of Johnson
Brothers.
III.
Bennett also alleged that Matthews was
liable for his workers' compensation coverage pursuant to the "statutory employer"
portion of § 35-1-42(2), which states:
Where any employer procures any
work to be done wholly or in part for him
by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, such contractor, all persons employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and all persons
employed by any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of the
original employer.
According to Professor Larson, statutes
of this kind were passed "to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability
on the presumably responsible principal
contractor, who has it within his power, in
choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their
responsibility and insist upon appropriate
compensation protection for their work-

ers." Larson, supra, § 49.14. A secondary purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of [workmen's compensation
acts] by those who might be tempted to
subdivide their regular operations among
subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations with the workers . . . "
Id. § 49.15.
[8] Under § 35-1-42(2), a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of
the general contractor if (1) the general
contractor retains some supervision or control over the subcontractor's work, and (2)
the work done by the subcontractor is a
"part or process in the trade or business of
the employer." E.g., Pinter Construction
Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d at 307 (Utah 1984);
Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission,
562 P.2d at 228-29; Harry L. Young &
Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d at 318
(1975).
A subcontractor's work is "part or process in the trade or business of the employer," if it is part of the operations which
directly relate to the successful performance of the general contractor's commercial
enterprise. Pinter Construction Co. v.
Frisby, 678 P.2d at 309; Lee v. Chevron
Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Utah 1977);
King v. Palmer, 129 Conn. 636, 640-41, 30
A.2d 549, 552 (1943). The trade or business of a general contractor in the construction business is construction, Smith v.
Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 158,
493 P.2d 994, 996 (1972); Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286,
289, 508 P.2d 805, 807 (1973); Annot, 150
A.L.R. 1214,1223 (1944), and any portion of
the general contractor's construction
project which is subcontracted out will ordinarily be considered "part or process in the
trade or business o f the general contractor.
[9] The requirement in § 35-1-42(2)
that the general contractor, as a "statutory
employer," retain "supervision or control"
over the work of the subcontractor who
hired the "statutory employee" cannot, by
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definition, be equated with the common law
standard for determining whether a person
is an employee or an independent contractor. In dealing with "statutory" employees, the statute begins with the proposition
that the claimant qualifies as an employee
of the subcontractor. But the statutory
requirement that the general contractor
have "supervision or control" over the
work of the subcontractor cannot mean
that the subcontractor must also qualify as
an employee of the general contractor.
That would be at least highly improbable
and perhaps impossible by definition.
Rather, the term "supervision or control"
requires only that the general contractor
retain ultimate control over the project.
Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678
P.2d at 309. As stated in Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz.App. 166, 436
P.2d 944 (1968),
The evidence is clear in the instant case
that the respondent construction company exercised that degree of control over
the job to be performed by the petitioner
sufficient to bring petitioner within the
meaning of § 23-902, subsec. B. They
provided the material that he was to use;
the job superintendent together with the
architect made inspections of the job and
there were consultations; but the final
and exclusive control of the job was vested in the job superintendent The fact
that petitioner was knowledgeable and
trusted in his field does not lessen the
ultimate control over the job by the job
superintendent
Id. at 16&-70, 436 P.2d at 947-48. In
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d
155, 493 P.2d 994, this Court found that the
general contractor held on a major construction project at Brigham Young University, by virtue of its ultimate supervisory control over the entire project, had
sufficient control over the masonry subcontractor on the project to warrant holding
the general contractor to be the statutory
employer of one of the masonry subcontractor's employees. Id. at 158-59, 493
P.2d at 996.
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[10] Although the construction process
requires the general contractor to delegate
to a greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor remains responsible for successful completion of the
entire project and of necessity retains the
right to require that subcontractors perform according to specifications. The power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of subcontractors satisfies the
requirement that the general contractor retain supervision or control over the subcontractor. See Pinter Construction Co. v.
Frisby, supra, 678 P.2d at 309. See generally Tanner Companies v. Superior
Court, 144 Ariz. 141,146, 696 P.2d 693, 698
(1985) (Feldman, J., dissenting). Therefore,
as long as a subcontractor's work is a part
or process of the general contractor's business, an inference arises that the general
contractor has retained supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to
meet the requirement of § 35-1-42(2). See
Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110
Utah 309, 316, 172 P.2d 136, 140 (1946).
Finally, we note that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act
supports the conclusion that § 35-1-42(2)
should be construed in favor of protecting
the employee. E.g., Pinter Construction,
678 P,2d at 307; Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d at
225, 364 P.2d at 1022 (1961); Spencer v.
Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185,
187-88, 290 P.2d 692, 693-94 (1955). The
Arizona Supreme Court, in construing an
almost identical statutory provision, has
stated that it "is a legislatively created
scheme by which conceded nonemployees
are deliberately brought within the coverage of the [Workmen's Compensation]
Act" Young v. Environmental Air Products, Inc., 136 Ariz. 158, 161, 665 P.2d 40,
43 (1983). Accord Larson, supra, § 49.00.
Wisconsin has also recognized the broad
scope of its similar statute:
The entire statutory scheme indicates a
desire on the part of the legislature to
extend the protection of these laws to
those who might not be deemed employ-
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ees under the legal concepts governing
the liability of a master for the tortious
acts of his servant
Price County Telephone Co. v. Lord, 47
Wis.2d 704, 715-16, 177 N.W.2d 904, 910
(1970) (footnote omitted).
The Industrial Commission did not address whether Bennett was a statutory employee of Matthews. We therefore remand
this case to the Commission for appropriate
findings on that issue in light of the principles discussed above.
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Reversed as to Johnson Brothers and
remanded for further proceedings as to
Matthews.
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ„ concur.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No, 86001236

*

ALLEN G. WHITE,

*
*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

JESS AYLETT dba
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION & DRYWALL
(UNINSURED),

*
*
*

AND ORDER

*
*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 9,
1987, at 8:30 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Sherlynn
W. Fenstermaker, Attorney at Law.
The defendant was represented by Attorneys Randall S.
Feil and Mark Ward.
The Uninsured Employers* Fund
Suzan Pixton, Administrator.

was

represented

The issues to be decided in this case are as follows:
1.

The employment status of the applicant at the time of
his industrial accident on March 17, 1986, i.e., was
he a statutory employee of Jess Aylett, an employee of
his brother, Steve White, or an independent contractor
not subject to the benefits of the Workers* Compensation Act.
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2.

The applicants average weekly wage at the time of his
injury.

3.

The time during which the applicant was temporarily
totally disabled following his industrial accident.

4.

The extent of permanent partial impairment resulting
from the applicant's industrial accident.

There are no medical issues in this case requiring an impartial
evaluation by a medical panel. The period of temporary total disability is
relatively short. The treating physician has provided an impairment rating.
Leave was given to the defendant to obtain an independent medical examination.
Arrangements for such were made, but subsequently cancelled and there is no
conflicting evidence before the Industrial Commission relative to the medical
issues.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The time and manner in which the applicant's industrial accident
occurred, and the resulting injuries, are not in dispute. The evidence shows
that on March 17, 1986, the applicant sustained a serious injury to his left
elbow while taping a garage. The garage ceiling was ten feet high and the
applicant was working on three foot stilts in order to reach the ceiling. The
stilts collapsed, causing the applicant to fall on the cement floor and he
sustained a fracture dislocation of the elbow joint.
2. Surgery was necessary and he was treated with open reduction and
internal fixation. Now that his condition has stabilized, he has a range of
motion of 30 to 90 degrees of flexion of his elbow and forty-five degrees of
pronation and supination. He has tenderness in the ulnar groove and about the
medial and lateral epicondyles of the elbow. He also has numbness in the
distribution of his ulnar nerve involving one-half of the ring and little
fingers of his hand. He has weakness of the intrinsic muscles, indicative of
tardy ulnar palsy of the left side. His impairment of function and restriction of motion has been rated by his treating physician as a 39% permanent
partial impairment of the left upper extremity.
3.
The applicant and his brother, Steve White, commonly worked
together as drywall applicators. At times, Steve White did business and bid
on jobs in the name of White Drywall. White Drywall has a business license,
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but the applicant does not. It was also the custom and practice of the applicant and his brother, Steve, to split their earnings from jobs in which they
worked together.
4. The evidence is clear that the jobs worked on, by the applicant
and his brother during the first quarter of 1986, were jobs contracted for by
Jess Aylett Construction. Mr. Aylett contacted Steve White in December of
1985, to see if he would be interested in working for him. He was then
engaged in another job and was not immediately interested, but did make
arrangements shortly thereafter to work for Mr. Aylett. In fairness to Mr.
Aylett, the reference to "working for him" is not intended to mean as an
employee. The applicant and his brother negotiated the price they were to be
paid on work done for Aylett Construction. They were offered 9i a foot, but
this was unacceptable and they finally agreed to work for 10^ a foot. The
evidence is quite clear that the White brothers considered themselves
^employees of Jess Aylett. On the other^ancT," Jess Aylett considered them as
independent contractors^ There was not much said to clarify the relationship
between them. The applicant and his brother testified that they requested
separate checks be issued to them in payment for their services. Separate
checks were periodically issued to them, but a recap of the checks shows that
this did not constitute an equal division of earnings and accomplished little
more than an accommodation to the White brothers. On their prior job, the
White brothers had payroll taxes deducted from their gross earnings. On jobs
done for Jess Aylett, they were paid the gross amount with no deductions^_ The
White brothers were experienced drywall applicators requiring no direction or
supervision in the performance of their work. They furnished their owo-iools,
including some specialized rental equipment, and for all intents and purposes
performed their work for Aylett Construction on a contract basis. In essence,
the White brothers were working for wages on a piece basis, but their relationship to Jess Aylett would more accurately be described as that of a subcontractor.
5. The applicant's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits,
and Jess Aylett's liability for payment of the same, does not depend on the
applicant being an independent contractor or an employee, but rather on
whether or not his work was that of a subcontractor engaged in the same trade
or business as Jess Aylett Construction. This is in conformity with the
holding in the recent case of Bennett v. Industrial Commission, filed
September 30. 1986. In Bennett, the Supreme Court dealt with coverage under
Section 35-1-42(2), which provides:
"Where any employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work
he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part
or process in the trade or business of the employer, such
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contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this
Section, employees of such original employer."
The1court stated that:
The requirement in Section 35-1-42(2) that the general
contractor as a 'statutory employer' retain 'supervision or
control' over the work of the subcontractor who hired the
•statutory employee' cannot, by definition, be equated with
the common law standard for determining whether a person is
an employee or an independent contractor. In dealing with
•statutory employees' the statute begins with the proposition that the claimant qualifies as an employee of the subcontractor. But the statutory requirement that the general
contractor have 'supervision or control' over the work of
the subcontractor cannot mean that the subcontractor must
also qualify as an employee of the general contractor.
That would be at least highly improbable and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather, the general 'supervision or
control' requires only that the general contractor retain
ultimate control over the project. . . The power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of subcontractors
satisfies the requirement that the general contractor
retain supervision or control over the subcontractor. . .
Therefore, as long as the subcontractor's work is a part or
process of the general contractor's business, an inference
arises that the general contractor has retained supervision
or control over the subcontractor sufficient to meet the
requirement of Section 35-1-42(2)."
The court also explained that:
"A subcontractor's work is 'part or process in the
trade or business of the employer,' if it is part of the
operations which directly relate to the successful performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise.
The trade or business of a general contractor in the construction business is construction, and any portion of the
general contractor's construction project which is subcontracted out will ordinarily be considered 'part or
process in the trade or business o f
the general
contractor." (Citations omitted)
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6. On many construction projects, there is a tier or several layers
of contractors and subcontractors. A question logically arises as to how far
up the ladder liability might extend in fixing liability on a statutory
employer. It appears this question was answered by the recent decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Dennis Jacobsen v. Industrial Commission,
filed June 15, 1987, in which the court referred to Arthur Larsen's Treatise
on Workmens* Compensation and added additional commentary. The court stated:
"[I]n the increasingly common situation displaying a
hierarchy of principal contractors upon subcontractors upon
subcontractors, if an employee of the lowest subcontractor
on the totem pole is injured, there is no practical reason
for reaching up the hierarchy any further than the first
insured contractor." 1C A. Larson, Workmenfs Compensation
Law. Section 49.14 (1986).
Ring (the direct employer) has no means to pay benefits to Pugh (the injured worker), but Jacobsen, (the first
contractor) the party secondarily liable, has insurance
coverage. If Jacobsen did not have sufficient funds or
coverage, then "every" employer of Pugh would be unable to
cover the liabilities for Pugh's benefits, as contemplated
in Section 35-1-107(1) (1986).
At that point, and not
until that point, the Uninsured Employers* Fund would come
into operation for the benefit of Pugh. In this case, it
is not necessary for the Fund to pay benefits since
Jacobsen and his insurer, the Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah, are required to pay because Ring cannot.
7.
In the instant case, Jess Aylett argues that Steve White is
liable to his brother, Allen, before any liability rests upon Aylett
Construction. This argument is on the theory that Aylett Construction engaged
Steve White, doing business as White Drywall, to do various jobs and that
Allen White was employed by Steve White. Thus, Allen White is claimed to be
an employee of Steve White and Aylett has no liability unless Steve White
cannot pay. Under certain circumstances, this argument would be plausible.
Jjunder the facts of this case, however, the argument is not plausible. Steve
and Allen White were working together. As between them, this was a joint
venture. They were both receiving the same amount of compensation for their
labor and neither were bidding on the various jobs, as would be expected of a
true contract. Allen White was not being paid by Steve White. Each were
receiving checks in their own name from time to time and it was their agreement that the earnings would be divided equally. Under these circumstances,
the Administrative Law Judge cannot find an employee-employer relationship
between Allen White and his brother Steve7J
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8. It is difficult to compute the applicant's average weekly wage
from the evidence submitted. Counsel for the defendant calculated the Whites'
gross receipts during the period January 1, 1986, to March 21, 1986, at
$9,218.65. This differs only a few dollars from the amount calculated by the
Administrative Law Judge and is therefore an acceptable statement of gross
receipts. Counsel for the defendant calculates a period of eighty days from
January 1, 1986, to March 21, 1986. The Administrative Law Judge believes
that January 1 and March 21 should be excluded from the calculation and that a
period of seventy-eight days, or 11.14 weeks should be used in calculating the
average weekly wage.
9. Counsel for the defendants also argues that the gross receipts
should be reduced by 20% to approximate the cost of tools and rental equipment
used by the Whites. There is no evidence before the Industrial Commission
reflecting the actual amount of such expense, but the applicant did indicate
such expenses were incurred. Twenty percent seems unusually high. Without
documented information as to the costs involved, the Administrative Law Judge
will not allow a deduction of more than 5% for purposes of calculating the
average weekly wage. If actual records or better estimates can be obtained
reflecting a more accurate cost figure, the Administrative Law Judge will
reserve the right to amend the award entered herein. A 5% reduction reduces
the gross receipts to $8,757.72. Assuming half of this, or $4,378.86, was
earned by the applicant, the calculated average weekly wage over this period
of time amounts to $393.07. Based on this figure, the rate of compensation
for temporary total disability is $262.00 per week, plus a $15.00 dependency
allowance, or $277.00 per week.
The rate of compensation for permanent
partial impairment is the statutory maximum of $215.00 per week.
10. The applicant testified he returned to work for a very few hours
in June of 1986, and then was not able to work again until sometime in July.
The statement of money earned, identified as Exhibit "A-3", shows the
applicant did receive compensation for June in the amount of $24 7.28 and he
received several checks for jobs done during the month of July. Without more
specific information relative to an actual return to work date, the
Administrative Law Judge finds July 1, 1986, to be the approximate date on
which the applicant returned to work, ending the period of temporary total
disability.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Applicant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result
of his industrial accident of March 21, 1986, in accordance with the foregoing
Findings of Fact.
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ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jess Aylett, dba Jess Aylett
Construction & Drywall, pay applicant compensation at the rate of $277.00 per
week for 14.57 weeks, or a total of $4,035.89, this amount, plus interest at
8% per annum from the date each payment would otherwise have been due and
payable, shall be paid in a lump sum, less attorney's fees.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Jess Aylett, dba Jess
Aylett Construction & Drywall, pay applicant compensation at the rate of
$215.00 per week for 72.93 weeks, or a total of $15,6 79.95 for 39% permanent
partial impairment of the applicant's left upper extremity. Interest on the
award shall be payable at the rate of 8% per annum. These benefits are due
and payable commencing July 1, 1986.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sherlynn W. Fenstermaker, attorney
for the applicant, be paid the sum of $$3,700.00, the same to be deducted from
the aforesaid award.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this
y g v day of September, 1987.
ATTEST:

J. Strartf&urg
Commission /Secretary
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0 51

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on September^1987, a copy of the attached Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:

Allen G, White
12665 South Martinez Way
Riverton, UT 84065
Sherlynn W. Fenstermaker
Attorney at Law
42 North University, Suite 1
Provo, UT 84601
Jess Aylett Construction & Drywall
11613 South High Mountain Drive
Sandy, UT 84092
Randall S. Feil
Mark Ward
Attorneys at Law
P. 0. Box 45450
Salt Lake City, UT

84145

Suzan Pixton, Administrator
Uninsured Employers Fund
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ALLEN G. WHITE,
Applicanty

*
*
*

*

ORDER DENYING

*

*

vs.
JESS AYLETT CONSTRUCTION &
DRYWALL

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

(UNINSURED)
Defendant.

*
*
* * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On September 9, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the
above-captioned case followed by a Supplemental Order on December 9, 1987, and
an Amended Supplemental Order on July IS, 1988. The three orders together
awarded the applicant temporary total compensation, medical expenses and
permanent partial impairment benefits (based on a medical panel rating of 30%
whole person) for a work injury Which occurred on March 17, 1986. The Order
concluded that the defendant, Jess Aylett Construction & Drywall, was the
statutory employer of the applicant and thus was liable to pay the applicant
the benefits awarded. The Administrative Law Judge based his conclusion that
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall was the applicant's statutory employer on
U. C. A. 35-1-42 (as it read in 1986) and on the Utah Supreme Court case,
Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
On August 19, 1988, pursuant to U. C. A. 35-1-82.53, the defendant,
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall, filed a pro se Motion for Review
renewing an earlier Motion for Review filed on October 8, 1987, by counsel for
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall. That earlier filed Motion for Review
addressed some issues that were later resolved by the Administrative Law
Judge*s December 9, 1987 Supplemental Order and the July 15, 1988 Amended
Supplemental
Order.
However, the Administrative Law Judge maintained
consistently throughout the three orders that Jess Aylett Construction and
Drywall was the applicants statutory employer and thus was liable for the
benefits awarded, and Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall renews its
objections to that finding in the most recent Motion for Review.
The renewed Motion for Review contains a long list of objections
which the Commission finds can be consolidated into two main Issues. The
defendant first argues that Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall cannot be a
statutory employer based on the Bennett rationale, because the Bennett case
dealt with a general contractor's liability as a statutory employer and Jess
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Aylett Construction and Drywall is not a general contractor, but rather only a
subcontractor. This exact argument was not directly addressed in any of the
Administrative Law Judge's three ox:ders, but the Administrative Law Judge does
comment on this argument in his Summary of Testimony. The Administrative Law
Judge states:
••I think to interpret Bennett as setting forth two standards
relative to a determination of statutory employment is
almost absurd.
It would make no sense at all to deny
coverage to those working under a subcontractor, but award
claims to those working under a subcontractor and a general
contractor."
The defendant's second main argument is that the primarily liable
individual in this case is Steve White dba White Drywall. The defendant
argues that the facts show that the applicant actually was working for his
brother, Steve White, and thus, Steve White should be found to be the
applicant's common law employer and primarily liable for the applicant's
workers compensation claim. On this argument, the Administrative Law Judge
states in his September 9, 1987 Order:
"Under the facts of this case, however, the argument is not
plausible. Steve and Allen White were working together.
As between them, this was a joint venture. They were both
receiving the same amount of compensation for their labor
and neither were bidding on the various jobs, as would be
expected of a true contract. Allen White was not being
paid by Steve White. Each were receiving checks in their
own name from time to time and it was their agreement that
the earnings would be divided equally.
Under these
circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge cannot find an
employee-employer relationship between Allen White and his
brother, Steve."
The Commission finds that the two issues discussed above are the
issues to be resolved on review. The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact
as stated by the Administrative Law Judge in his September 9, 1987 Order.
With respect to the defendant's first main argument, the Commission agrees
with the Administrative Law Judge*s interpretation of the holding in the
Bennett case. Although in the Bennett case, the facts involved an injured
employee attempting to recover benefits from the general contractor who
subcontracted out to his employer, the Court in Bennett is interpreting the
scope of the "statutory employer clause" in U. C. A. 35-1-42. That statute
does not speak in terms of general contractors and subcontractors, but simply
refers to those procuring work to be done by a contractor. Also, as the
Administrative Law Judge points out, there is no logical reason to find that
only those workers who can find a "general contractor" in the contract chain
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are protected. Therefore, the Commission finds that the Bennett rationale
(i. e. limited control is sufficient in order to find statutory employment) is
applicable
to any contractual
relationship which would include the
contractual relationship between the applicant and the defendant, Jess Aylett
Construction and Drywall.
With respect to the defendant's second argument regarding the
applicant actually being employed by his brother, the Commission also agrees
with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion. The applicant was paid by
Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall and not by his brother and the applicant
shared the cost of renting equipment with his brother as opposed to his
brother providing the tools. The facts show a partnership or joint venture
and not employment. As such, the applicant had no common law employer which
results in the statutory employer being liable for the benefits awarded.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Commission finds that the Administrative
Law Judge correctly found Jess Aylett Construction and Drywall to be liable
for the applicant's workers compensation benefits.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's August 19, 1988 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's September 9, 1987,
December 9, 1987, and September 15, 1988 Orders are hereby affirmed and final
with appeal to the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the final
agency action as specified in U. C. A. 63-46b-12 through U. C. A. 63-46b-14
and U. C. A. 35-1-86.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of CJtah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
..day of February, 1989.
ATTEST

j^*4<&<$<dwd&/rf
Linda J. Stpasburg
Commissioiy'secretary
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